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GUERRILLAS IN OUR MIDST: THE 
ASSAULT ON RADICALS IN 
AMERICAN LAW 
Daria Roithmayr* 
BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN 
AMERICAN LAW. By Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 1997. Pp. 195. $25. 
On October 9, 1997, radicals everywhere celebrated the thirtieth 
anniversary of the death of Che Guevara, the revered Cuban and 
South American rebel known as much for his guerrilla manifestos 
as for his scraggly facial hair and the black beret positioned slightly 
askance. 
At the same time Latin Americans and revolutionaries were 
marking the death of their beloved Che, Professors Daniel Farber 
and Suzanna Sherry were publishing their long-awaited book, Be­
yond All Reason: The Radical Assault on Truth in American Law. 
The professors' timing was, unintentionally, quite appropriate. 
Like many of Che's manifestos, the book sounds an ideological call 
to arms, urging liberals to root out the insurgents of radical legal 
theory, which threatens the very foundations of American Law, 
legal culture, and, indeed, life as we know it. Or so the authors 
would have us believe. 
The very subtitle of the book - "The Radical Assault on Truth 
in American Law" - conjures up a vision of crazy ideologues, de­
scending on law schools in ever-increasing numbers,1 seeking to 
subvert the academy and overthrow the Enlightenment as they rush 
to man the barricades. Playing on an already well-developed "Che 
anxiety" in liberals and conservatives,2 the authors paint radical 
scholars as dangerous subversives, skulking about darkly in the an­
nals of American law reviews and planting seeds of treason against 
the all-sacred Truth in the minds of impressionable young law stu­
dents. Thumbing through the first chapter, we can almost picture 
angry radical scholars, dark-skinned fanatics in their Che berets, 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. B.S. 1984, Univer­
sity of California at Los Angeles; J.D. 1990, Georgetown. - Ed. 
1. Over 300 people attended the last national conference on Critical Race Theory, held at 
Yale Law School in November 1997. Conversation with Harlon Dalton, Professor of Law, 
Yale, and co-organizer for the Conference on Critical Race Theory, February 5, 1998. 
2. See Paul Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEG. Enuc. 222 (1984) (warning law 
schools to oust the nihilistic Critical Legal Studies scholars in the academy). 
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Army fatigues and camouflage war paint, overturning tables and 
toting fearsome black Uzis, with bayonets ready to slice through the 
most well-reasoned judicial opinion.3 There is' much to fear from 
these infiltrators, advise Farber and Sherry, despite the fact that 
radical scholars are in the minority on law school campuses. "War 
and ideas are difficult to contain" (p. 5). 
In direct contrast to the disorder and violence of this lunatic 
fringe,4 Farber and Sherry position themselves as soothingly ra­
tional and moderate, acolytes of a calm, well-reasoned pragmatism 
that concedes where it must, but fights to vanquish the threat of 
violent chaos with superior logic and reason. We picture Farber 
and Sherry, well-dressed not in natty bow tie and smart Nord­
strom's business ensemble (as illustrated on the inside of the book 
jacket),5 but in ethereal, appropriately Socratic garb - perhaps 
translucent white robes - with the Light of Truth and Reason shin­
ing down upon their earnest, upturned faces. 
In their book, these soldier-scholars of goodness and light argue 
in increasingly rising tones that we cannot give up our faith in Rea­
son and Truth - without it, we are left to the dictates of the dark 
side, where force, violence, and power are the only way to adjudi­
cate competing claims. Radical theory is also condemnable for 
other reasons: it is anti-Semitic and it distorts public discourse. But 
above all else, radical theory is inevitably nihilist and politically to­
talitarian. Without Truth, we have no hope of protecting the dis­
empowered or of adjudicating between competing philosophies. 
Without the shield of the Enlightenment, we have no response to 
those who would claim that the Holocaust never happened, and no 
defense to those who would shoot us on the spot with no 
explanation. 6 
3. This description plays off of the "Heart of Darkness" metaphor, used by critics in the 
early 1980s to describe radical Critical Legal Studies scholars. See Louis B. Schwartz, With 
Gun and Camera Through Darkest CLS-Land, 36 STAN. L. REv. 41'.?, 413-22 (1984) (arguing 
that CLS suffers from "remorseless savagery" and a "siege mentality"). 
4. Actually, Judge Richard Posner argues that Richard Delgado, Patricia Williams, and 
Derrick Bell, all scholars of color who are targeted by Farber and Sherry, constitute the 
"lunatic core" of the movement; the "rational fringe" of the movement is made up of Michel 
Foucault, Stanley F!Sh, Duncan Kennedy, and Catherine MacKinnon, who, perhaps coinci­
dentally, are all white. See Richard Posner, The Skin Trade, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 
1997, at 40 (reviewing Beyond All Reason). 
5. Anyone (except for Judge Posner) who has ever met or seen pictures of some of the 
radical scholars discussed in the book - in particular, Kim Cre�shaw (with flowing 
dreadlocks), Patricia Williams (also a dread enthusiast), Gary Peller (formerly sporting a 
long ponytail and unruly beard), and Richard Delgado (with wild, untamable mane of black 
hair) - would quickly figure out who the guerrillas were, based on hairstyle comparisons 
alone. But see Posner, supra note 4, at 41-42 (arguing that Delgado "looks like a direct de­
scendant of Isabel and Ferdinand - he's as white as I am"). 
6. P. 71 (recounting the Holocaust story of a Jew who was ordered shot by the Nazis, to 
argue that objective concepts of merit are necessary to prevent such tragedies). 
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Yet something about the authors' argument catches our atten­
tion. How is it that calm rationalism beats back the dangerous ni­
hilism of ideological radical scholarship? How is it exactly that 
reason goes about quelling the violence of Nazis and irrational radi­
cal scholars? It does not take long to figure out - once the thought 
occurs to us - that rationalism can displace anarchy and disorder 
only if it possesses some coercive power of its own. Reason and 
trut� can only quell the terrorist assault of radical theory if reason 
and truth are actually weapons in a counter-counterinsurgency.7 
That is, reason and truth must possess the coerciveness and violence 
of Che's shiny Uzi, if truth is to function as the conversation­
stopper, or right answer, that Farber and Sherry envision it to be. 
And so it comes to pass that Farber and Sherry are revealed, not 
as the descendants of Socrates, but only as Che Guevaras in law 
professor clothing, brave soldiers8 fighting a battle to defend a 
political and legal ideology of their own. 
* * * 
The foregoing introduction is meant to be a lighthearted - and 
therefore very serious - poke at the earnestness with which Farber 
and Sherry undertake their mission of warning the world against 
radical legal theory. Despite their penchant for drama, or perhaps 
because of it, Beyond All Reason is quite a provocative book, the 
first large-scale attempt-to provide the rationalist response to radi­
cal legal thought. The book is a collection (with substantial revision 
and reorganization) of several law review articles coauthored by the 
authors, together with several articles written by each individually. 
The collection does a nice job of integrating these former articles 
and essays· into a coherent whole, and of attempting a comprehen­
sive indictment of radical legal theory and defense of Enlighten­
ment rationalism. 
Great organization does much of the trick. In the first part of 
the book, Farber and Sherry attempt to document the radical cri­
tique, "explor[ing] the tenets of radical multiculturalism" and try­
ing "to establish that there are indeed a number of prominent legal 
scholars who are taking quite extreme positions about truth, merit, 
legal reasoning" (p. 11). 
7. See Gary Peller, Reason and the Mob, 2 Tn<KUN 28, 92 {1989) ("[I]t strikes us as ini­
tially dissonant that the intellectuals are asked to 'quell' the mob. The very ability of the 
intellect to 'quell' suggests that in some way the intellectuals are like the mob, possessing 
coercive power. Yet it was the potential for the mob to coerce that justified its regulation by 
the intellectuals. The power of the intellect to 'quell' introduces the possibility that reason is 
actually a means of discipline, a coercive technology for the social regulation of passion and 
emotion . . . .  Like the mob, reason promises a coerced social order based on a particular 
social desire"). 
8. P. 14 (noting that the authors had been warned of the danger of writing the book); 
Alex Kozinski, Bending the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1997, § 7 (Book Review), at 46 (assert­
ing that the authors "have taken a personal risk" in publishing their book). 
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The second part of the book levies a three-pronged pragmatist 
critique of radical legal 1 theory. First, . the authors argue, radical 
legal theory is pragmatically undesirable because of its impact on 
certain groups. In particular, the critique of merit is anti-Semitic 
and anti-Asian because "[it] implies that Jews and Asian Americans 
are unjustly favored in the distribution of social goods" (p. 11). 
Second, radical legal theory produces unacceptable distortions in 
scholarship and public discourse, because radical storytelling is 
atypical and self-interested, which makes civil dialogue with critics 
difficult if not impossible (pp. 72-94). Finally, radical legal theory is 
nihilist because it accepts all competing viewpoints and arguments 
and cultures as equally valid, thus eliminating any defense against 
those who deny the existence of the Holocaust or promote totalitar­
ianism (pp. 95-117). In general, the authors argue, we should em­
brace Enlightenment rationalism because it is better at promoting 
equality, because it provides a way to choose between competing 
viewpoints, and because it provides us with a strong defense against 
evil. 
Part I of this review sorts out the authors' rendition of radical 
legal theory, and then sets out a more fully-fleshed-out account of 
radical legal thought beyond the truncated version that Farber and 
Sherry have provided. Part II examines the authors' rationalist de­
fense of merit and argues that their defense eventually undermines 
itself when pushed to its logical conclusion. Part III similarly 
deconstructs the authors' argument .that radical theory degrades 
public discourse. Finally, ·Part IV reviews.the authors' nihilism ar­
gument, using it as a point of departure to contrast the authors' 
overly conservative pragmatism with Richard Rorty's progressive 
pragmatism, and then with a form of pragmatism that I call radical 
pragmatism. 
I. PUNCH LINES 0NL y 
In Chapters -One and Two, Farber and Sherry attempt to docu­
ment the views of prominent radical legal scholars, and to link their 
critical arguments to such revolutionary concepts as storytelling 
scholarship and hate speech proposals. The authors do a nice 
enough job of tracing the origins of radical legal theory from real­
ism to Critical Legal Studies ("CLS"), and subsequently to Critical 
Race Theory ("CRT"), Radical Feminism, and, more generally, 
postmodernism. 
The authors oversimplify a bit when they try to conflate Critical 
Race Theory \vith postmodernism. In fact, many Critical Race The­
ory scholars have rejected the pure post�odernist argument that 
race is "socially constructed" and .therefore. meaningless as an es­
sential category for making sense of social experiences. Scholars 
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like Angela Harris argue that Critical Race Theory exhibits a ten­
sion between the postmodern argument that race is a socially con­
structed concept and the more modernist claim that race 
nevertheless forms the basis for much of a person of color's experi­
ence of social life.9 
Farber and Sherry are also a bit off-base with their references to 
schools of thought and their categorizing of particular authors. 
With regard to the former, for example, they seem to find 
postmodernism, deconstruction, and "social constructionism" to be 
interchangeable,10 though most scholars on those subjects would 
beg to differ.11 With regard to categorizing scholars, the authors 
label Jerry Lopez as a critical race theorist, even though he and his 
writing do not clearly fall within the genre.12 Similarly, they charac­
terize Rob�rt Post as a solid liberal, and not at all radical, when 
some of his writings on free speech appear to belie that 
description.13 
All might be forgiven in the name of simplifying ideas for the 
lay audience, were it not for a more serious transgression that Far­
ber and Sherry commit throughout the book. When sketching the 
tenets of radical theory, the authors present the radical scholars' 
conclusions without providing any of their underlying analysis or 
explanation. Of course, conclusions without any supporting analy­
sis are about as silly as punch lines without the set-up for the joke. 
It may be that Farber and Sherry are rather ungenerously "setting 
up" the radical scholars for the critique that radical theory is just 
out to lunch. Or perhaps the authors are just not quite able to 
grasp the analysis behind the radical argument. Indeed, if the radi­
cal argument is as obviously silly as the authors suggest, one won­
ders why the authors devoted a whole book to responding. 
To be sure, the authors openly acknowledge their penchant for 
cheating the radical arguments of their full force.14 But that does 
9. See Angela Harris, Aftenvord: Other Americas, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1150, 1155 {1997) 
("[C]ritical race theorists are constantly trying to expose the truth to the world, hoping 
against hope that their other, unsullied America will rise up in righteous indignation and 
sweep away injustice . . . .  [C]ritical race theorists face a serious dilemma when they try to 
speak truth to power."). , 
10. "The radicals' core beliefs go by many names: social constructionism, postmodern· 
ism, deconstructionism. Don't let all the isms fool you . . . .  " P. 23. 
11. See generally GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS (1995). 
12. P. 39. Conversation with Gerald Lopez, Professor of Law, U.C.L.A., Jan. 25, 1998. 
13. Compare pp. 6, 45 (Post has "applauded 'fidelity to reason"' and has criticized univer­
sity hate speech regulations on the grounds of "public reason") with Robert G. Post, The 
Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, 
and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARv. L. REv. 603, 683 (1990) (arguing that "the 
boundaries of public discourse cannot be fixed in a neutral fashion" but inevitably must "be 
defined by reference to ideological presuppositions"). 
14. P. 16 ("In the interest of brevity and readability, we have limited many of the direct 
quotations from their works to a single sentence or less . .  : . For readers who want to investi-
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not excuse them from their failure to engage the strongest version 
of radical legal theory. Take, for example, this paragraph that ap­
pears in Chapter 1: 
Harvard law professor Duncan Kennedy, a founder of CLS, has ex­
pressed 'a pervasive skepticism' about current societal standards: 
"We just don't believe that it is real 'merit' that institutions measure, 
anywhere in the system." "Judgments of merit," he says, "are inevita­
bly culturally and ideologically contingent." Thus there can be no ob­
jective standard of merit applicable to all groups within the society. 
[Stanley] Fish states unequivocally that "there is no such thing as in­
trinsic merit." [p. 31] 
Of course, without the benefit of either Kennedy or Fish's sup­
porting argument, most readers would find this argument more 
than a little extreme. It appears less zany, however, in the full con­
text of the supporting analysis and explanation. In fact, the text in 
Kennedy's article immediately preceding his statement about judg­
ments of merit provides both a more substantive analysis for his 
argument and a more specific context for his conclusion: 
[A particular piece of scholarship] can be judged only by reference to 
a particular research tradition or scholarly paradigm, usually one 
among many that might have won dominance in the field. Yet conclu­
sions at the level of what is valuable or interesting are very often dis­
positive in deciding which of two articles is better. 
Once we acknowledge the possible existence of different research 
traditions, or collective scholarly projects, we have to acknowledge 
that the white male occupants of faculty positions have more than the 
power to decide which performances are better. They have also had 
the power to create the traditions or projects within which they will 
make these judgments. It seems obvious that these traditions or 
projects are culturally and ideologically specific products.15 
Whether or not one agrees with Kennedy, his conclusion that 
judgments of merit are inevitably ideological seems far more per­
suasive than extreme when resituated in the context of his full argu­
ment about research traditions. 
Nor do Farber and Sherry provide Kennedy's analysis behind 
his first statement that none of us believes that merit really works in 
any system. From the rest of the article, readers discover that the 
"we" in Kennedy's statement is not society at large but a much 
smaller group of folks who have succeeded at elite institutions while 
gate the radicals' writings more fully, the endnotes provide citations for every quotation and 
paraphrase"). Unfortunately, the endnotes are quite sloppy. Rather than reference citations 
individually as they appear, Farber and Sherry prefer to endnote whole paragraphs and sort 
out the references via parentheticals after the quoted source. Deciphering which source goes 
\vith which reference can become quite complicated and tedious, and often is imprecise. See, 
e.g., p. 156 n.37 and accompanying text. 
15. Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal 
Academia, 1990 DuKE L.J. 705, 733. 
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feeling alienated within them. And "we" don't believe in the idea 
of objective and apolitical merit, not because we have lost our 
minds, but because we think that 
success is a function of particular knacks, some socially desirable (be­
ing "smart") and some not (sucking up) - and of nothing more gran­
diose. This is not rejection of the idea that some work is better than 
other work. It is rejection of the institutional mechanisms that cur­
rently produce such judgments, of the individuals who manage the 
institutions, and of the substantive outcomes.16 
Oddly enough, despite Kennedy's statement about some work 
being better than other work, Farber and Sherry preface their cita­
tion to Kennedy with a statement that radical theorists "reject the 
possibility that one person could actually be a 'better A' than an­
other" (p. 31). Indeed, Kennedy concludes that there are standards 
for judging someone to be a better A, and that those standards are 
a product of the social conventions that a particular group or insti­
tution finds useful. But neither that idea nor the full flavor of Ken­
nedy's claim comes through in Farber and Sherry's "Quotable 
Quotes" version of radical theory. 
In fact, great chunks of Farber and Sherry's primer on radical 
legal theory look like a collection of provocative citations from au­
thors, strung together for maximum effect, but without any support­
ing analysis. At the end of a long paragraph full of citations, for 
example, the authors present a partial reference to Patricia Wil­
liams: "Words such as experienced and qualified are, according to 
Patricia Williams, 'con words, shiny mirrors that work to dazzle the 
eye."'17 Again, the punch line without the joke looks a bit over­
heated. Where has the rest of Williams's argument - the substan­
tive part of it - gone? 
In the unabridged version, Williams argues that merit standards 
necessarily embody collective subjective preferences for certain 
qualities or abilities.18 That fact does not make them necessarily 
evil, according to Williams. "I wonder what a world 'without pref­
erence' would look like anyway . . . .  Preferential treatment isn't in­
herently dirty."19 More the focus of Williams's critique is that, 
although merit standards are developed by particular people at a 
particular place and in a particular historical time, conventional 
thinking disguises merit standards as apolitical, objective, universal 
measurements of ability and achievement. 
16. Id. at 708. 
17. P. 32 (quoting PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 103 
(1991)). 
18. See WILLIAMS, supra note 17, at 102 ("The fundamental isolationism of individual 
preference as an arbiter is quite different from the 'neutrality,' the 'blindness,' and the 'im­
personality' used to justify the collectivized convenience of standardized preference."). 
19. Id. at 102-03. 
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Similarly in that vein, Williams criticizes the overtly political as­
sociations that conservatives have created between affirmative ac­
tion and "quotas, preference, reverse discrimination," as well as the 
purportedly apolitical associations between conventional merit and 
the concepts of "experienced" and "qualified." Williams argues 
that such associations are misleading - and perhaps racist - be­
cause they acontextually equate remedial affirmative action with in­
tentional discrimination against people of color, and portray merit 
as though it depended on something other than collective subjective 
preference: 
Thus, affirmative action is very different from numerical quotas that 
actively structure society so that certain classes of people remain un­
preferred. "Quotas," "preference," "reverse discrimination," "exper­
ienced," and "qualified" are con words, shiny mirror words that work 
to dazzle the eye with their analogic evocation of other times, other 
contexts, multiple histories. As a society, we have yet to look care­
fully beneath them to see where seeds of prejudice are truly hidden.20 
When the full statement is set forth, and the entire line of argu­
ment laid out, Williams looks a little less like a member of the "lu­
natic fringe" the authors try to portray her as, and much more like 
the brilliant, sophisticated scholar that she is. 
IL THE CRITIQUE OF MERIT 
One of the more important moments of the book comes in the 
chapter entitled "Is the Critique of Merit Anti-Semitic?"(pp. 52-
71). In this chapter, Farber and Sherry devote a great amount of 
time to denouncing the radical critique of merit for being anti­
Semitic and anti-Asian-American to boot. Initially, Farber and 
Sherry set out a somewhat oversimplified version of the radical cn­
tique of merit, focusing on the argument that "the powerful define 
standards of merit to reinforce their own dominance" (p. 53). 
Farber and Sherry dispute that radical argument with the empii­
ical claim that Jews and Asian Americans have enjoyed dispropor­
tionate· success under conventional merit standards (pp. 57-58). 
From that premise, the authors make two points. First, they argue 
that the success of Jews and Asian Americans is inconsistent with 
the radical argument that merit standards were constructed to ex­
clude people of color (p. 56). Second, they assert that the radical 
critique is anti-Semitic and anti-Asian, because the critique of merit 
indicts the standards under which these groups have achieved their 
success, and "implies that Jews and Asian Americans are unjustly 
favored in the social distribution of goods."21 The better and more 
20. Id. at 103. 
21. Pp. 10-11; see also p. 61 ("[I]f standards of merit are socially constructed creations of a 
racist society, the radicals must necessarily condemn Jews and Asians for succeeding."). 
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likely argument, say the authors, is that Jews and Asian Americans 
have succeeded in disproportionate numbers because their cultural 
values happen to correspond with those required by objective merit 
standards (pp. 59-60). "If objective merit is wholly irrelevant, it is 
difficult to account for Jewish or Asian success" (p. 59). 
Although the authors struggle to define "merit" and what 
makes it "objective," they· appear to settle on the idea that merit 
standards measure traits with objective value like talent and 
achievement, rather than characteristics like race or wealth which 
have no such value (p. 54). To deal with the question of what con­
stitutes objective value, the authors suggest that we as a society can 
settle on some widely shared criteria about what makes for a good 
basketball player - Michael Jordan is a star by any measure - or a 
beautiful performance of European classical music - Yo-Yo Ma, 
perhaps (p. 54). 
Ultimately, the authors set forth a quite conventionally rational­
ist defense of objective merit: 
. The meritocratic ideal is that positions in society should be based on 
the abilities and achievements of the individual, rather than on char­
acteristics such as family background, race, religion, or wealth. This 
ideal requires that merit be objective in the sense of being definable 
without regard to those personal characteristics . . . .  Under this con­
ventional view, the ultimate conception of merit is color-blind and 
gender-blind. Its advocates believe that people are treated unjustly 
and discriminated against when their merit is assessed according to 
their status rather than according to the value of their traits or prod­
ucts. Thus, for instance, under this conception of merit, racial dis­
crimination "is irrational and unjust because it denies the individual 
what is due hi.ill or her under the society's agreed standards of merit." 
[pp. 54-55] [citation omitted] 
A. Deconstructing Distinctions 
As the passage above illustrates, the authors' claims about the 
value of merit rely on a strong distinction between race-neutral 
merit and race-conscious bias. According to the passage cited 
above, merit is objective because it relies on standards that ration­
ally relate to abilities and traits that are relevant to "the job" or 
"the educational opportunity." Bias, in contrast, is subjective be­
cause it relies on status-based traits like race or gender that are ir­
relevant to performance on the job or in school. 
This distinction collapses, however, if merit standards them­
selves defer to and depend upon collective status-conscious and 
race-conscious social biases. And such turns out to be the case. As 
discussed in the next section, judgments about what counts as abil­
ity or social value in general are necessarily collective subjective 
assessments, which are based in large part on the historical contin-
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gency of a particular social, economic, and political ·context. Shared 
norms about merit are very much a function of social power, which 
historically has been closely tied to the race, gender, and class of 
those with power. 
To use the authors' reference to music, for example, only the 
opinions of a select group of European decisionmakers during a 
particular historical period counted in deciding what constitutes 
beautiful "classical" music. We say that Yo-Yo Ma's music has 
merit not only because it has aesthetic appeal but also because we 
defer to and depend on this European group's contingent "bias" for 
music with these particular characteristics. At this point, it becomes 
difficult if not impossible to distinguish merit criteria from bias. 
Accordingly, if merit is just a particular form of socially acceptable 
bias, then it loses the privilege with which Farber and Sherry defend 
it. 
B. Deconstruction Applied 
Using this deconstructive line of argument, merit standards 
themselves can be criticized as unfairly discriminatory. For exam­
ple, under the recently implemented SP-1 admissions process, Uni­
versity of California law schools rely heavily on the Law School 
Admissions Test (LSAT) and on an applicant's grade point average 
to measure the applicant's potential ability to do well in law school. 
But the demand for high LSAT scores and GPAs constitutes subjec­
tive collective bias by legal professionals for certain skills or charac­
teristics. More importantly, those professional biases historically 
were developed in an explicitly class-, gender-, and race-conscious 
way. 
As I have argued elsewhere, law school admissions standards, 
and more generally many of the professional values in the legal 
community were developed at a time when the profession affirma­
tively and deliberately excluded blacks, Latina/os, and white 
women.22 Moreover, legal educators developed the earliest proto­
type of the LSAT in conjunction with a more general societal move 
toward ability testing, a process explicitly designed to justify exclud­
ing people of color and southern and eastern Europeans from edu­
cational and professional opportunity.23 In short, the professional 
values and merit standards that continue to govern the legal profes­
sion today are the offspring of this race- and gender-conscious deci­
sionmaking by the elite white male leaders of the profession, who 
protected their status by excluding white women and people of 
color from their ranks. In light of such history, it should come as no 
22. See Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between Bias and Merit, 85 CAL. 
L. REv. 1449, 1476-91 (1997). 
23. See id. at 1487-91. 
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great surprise that selection criteria like admissions standards for 
law school continue to exclude people of color disproportionately. 
In the context of law school admissions, then, Farber and 
Sherry's argument in favor of merit can be used to challenge the 
very merit criteria they seek to defend. If, as Farber and Sherry 
argue, bias is to be condemned because it is race-conscious, status­
oriented, arbitrary, and irrational, then as a matter of logic, race­
conscious, status-oriented law school admissions standards ought to 
be condemned for the same reasons. Unfortunately, because 
"probing intellectual analysis" lies outside Farber and Sherry's area 
of expertise (their words, not mine),24 they do not offer any re­
sponse at a theoretical level to this radical critique of merit. 
C. The Model Minority Question: "If We Can Do It, Why 
Can't You?" 
Farber and Sherry's initial question remains: If professional val­
ues and merit standards were developed in a race-conscious context 
and in conjunction with affirmative efforts to keep immigrants and 
blacks qut of the profession, how is it that Jews.and some groups of 
Asians have enjoyed disproportionate success (pp. 59-60)? As a 
preliminary matter, readers should question the inquiry's empirical 
premise. In framing their question, Farber and Sherry inappropri­
ately lump all Asian-American groups and Asians into the group 
"Asians," and do not differentiate Chinese, Korean, and Japanese 
Americans or foreign nationals, who for some professions have en­
joyed disproportionate success, from other Asian-American groups 
like Laotians, Cambodians, Hmong, and Vietnamese, whose in­
come levels and levels of success are far below that of either whites 
or Chinese Americans and Japanese Americans.25 
In addition, Farber and Sherry inappropriately lump all people 
of color together when they argu� that Asian and Jewish success 
undermines the social construction theory of merit. Farber and 
Sherry themselves acknowledge the possibility that differences in 
cultural history between Jews and some Asian groups on the one 
hand, and blacks and Latino/as on the other, might explain the dif­
ference in success rates under socially constructed merit standards. 
But they minimize that possibility by arguing that this explanation 
is theoretically incompatible with the radical critique of merit. 
First, they suggest that if cultural differences in fact do explain 
differential success rates, it is because those differences are adap-
24. P. 9 {"Although not itself a theory, an ideology will typically be associated with fully 
developed theories, which in turn can be subjected to probing intellectual analysis. Such a 
critique [of radical multiculturalism] lies outside our expertise . . .  "). 
25. See Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian-American Legal Scholarship, 1 AsrAN L.J. 1, 
21 {1994). 
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tive. That is, Jewish and Asian cultural values - perhaps an em­
phasis on completion of formal education or mastery of the written 
text - coincide with mainstream merit because Jewish and Asian 
cultural performances are objectively meritorious cultural perform­
ances (p. 60). That argument of course completely sidesteps the 
original radical point that there exists no such creature as objective 
merit. 
Second, Farber and Sherry suggest that Jewish and some Asian 
groups' disproportionate success is incompatible with the notion of 
social construction. In particular, if white gentiles had indeed con­
structed merit standards, they would not have allowed Jews and 
some Asians to overtake them. "If the elite do construct the stan­
dards for their own benefit, then white gentiles might allow Jews 
and Asians to succeed, but they would not allow them to surpass" 
(p. 60). 
Farber and Sherry, however, do not take that analysis far 
enough. It is possible that dominant groups historically constructed 
merit standards that naturally favored their own cultural perform­
ances, but that after formal discrimination wa� outlawed, groups 
like Jews and som.e Asian groups in some professions began to out­
perform them on the measures they constructed. In contrast, other 
groups like Latino/as or African Americans, who had entirely dif­
ferent social, political, and cultural histories, continued to be ex­
cluded by those standards. This alternative explanation, completely 
ignored by the· authors, is perfectly consistent with the radical cri­
tique of merit. 
Moreover, there is evidence that dominant groups have at­
tempted to exclude those groups that might outperform them oh 
merit-based measures. The authors themselves recognize that, at 
least with regard to educational admissions, significant efforts have 
been made to prevent Jews and Asians from "surpassing," by ex­
panding merit to include "character" and "geographic diversity," 
and to keep out Asians and Asian Americans who score dispropor­
tionately well on standardized tests by including criteria of "leader­
ship" and "social and community involvement."26 Similarly, 
negative stereotypes of Jews and Asians who succeed at certain 
professions lend support to the idea that the dominant majority has 
tried to prevent certain groups from outperforming them by stigma-
tizing them for their success.27 . 
In any event, it would have been far more productive for Farber 
and Sherry to undertake a historical inquiry about the groups they 
discuss - to determine how Jews and some Asian and Asian-
26. Pp. 60-61. Farber and Sherry believe that such efforts are atypical and unrepresenta­
tive. Id. 
27. See generally Chang, supra note 25. 
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American groups have participated in the development, or fared 
under the operation, of conventional merit standards.28 Ahistorical 
comparisons seem to be of little help, and appear to suggest that all 
people of color are interchangeable, rather than members of differ­
ent groups with different histories, different cultural traditions, and 
different identities. 
Farber and Sherry's analysis of Jewish and Asian success pro­
vides evidence for, and not an argument against, the idea that dif­
ferent racial and ethnic groups achieve different rates of success. 
Indeed, their analysis reinforces Duncan Kennedy's earlier argu­
ment that merit standards are in some way tied to the acquisition of 
cultural capital or to the history of a particular group or ethnicity. 
To acknowledge that claim in no way discounts the value of Jewish 
and Chinese-, Korean-, and Japanese-American achievement; it 
simply recognizes that the assessment of what constitutes a good 
indicator for achievement in a particular profession, what consti­
tutes appropriate education in that profession, and indeed how the 
profession itself is structured, are all collectively subjective judg­
ments that are inevitably culturally and historically specific. 
III. DEGRADING PUBLIC DISCOURSE: THE CRITIQUE 
OF STORYTELLING 
In Chapters Two and Four, Farber and Sherry pack a pretty pro­
vocative punch when they argue against the genre of scholarship 
called storytelling. Storytelling is a type of scholarship that relies 
on descriptive narrative to redescribe conventional legal argument 
or doctrine, and to expose new and fresh insights about legal insti­
tutions. Some good examples of critical legal storytelling include 
Patricia Williams's work, Richard Delgado's Rodrigo Chronicles, 
and Derrick Bell's fictional narratives.29 
The authors denounce storytelling for several reasons. First, 
they argue that because radical stories tend to be about law profes­
sors, lawyers, or litigants, those stories are atypical and unrepre­
sentative, and thus distort rational debate on issues like merit (pp. 
73, 77-78). Second, according to the authors, the stories overly em­
phasize the unique perspective of radical authors (their "authentic 
perspective"), and communities of color and white women fre­
quently end up fighting over who has the right to speak on behalf of 
28. For an example of such an inquiry related to Jewish success, see Deborah Malamud, 
The Jew Taboo: Jewish Difference and the Affirmative Action Debate, 49 OHIO ST. LJ. {forth­
coming). For an example of a historical inquiry relating to Asian Americans, see THE AsIAN­
AMEruCAN EouCATIONAL EXPERIENCE_ (Don T. Nakanishi & Tma Yamana Nishida eds., 
1995). 
29. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 17; Derrick Bell, Foreword: The Civil Rights 
Chronicles, 99 liARv. L. REv. 4 {1985); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Tenth Chronicle: Merit 
and Affirmative Action, 83 GEO. LJ. 1711 {1995). 
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particular groups (pp. 73, 78-83). Third, unlike conventional legal 
argument, say the authors, stories are subject to multiple interpreta­
tions because they lack clarity and analysis.3° Finally, Farber and 
Sherry claim that radical authors tend to misinterpret and take too 
personally any critique of their autobiographical stories as ad 
hominem attacks, which makes any real exchange of ideas difficult, 
if not altogether impossible (pp. 73-74, 88-94). 
Throughout Farber and Sherry's argument, the reader detects a 
distinct discomfort with attaching the label of legal scholarship to 
any argument that does not take the conventional form. Indeed, 
Farber and Sherry would appear to cast doubt on much legal argu­
ment that is not perfectly statistically representative, does not pro­
ceed in linear fashion Jrom argument to definitive conclusion, or is 
not detached in a modernist, scholarly "we-are-just-stroking-our­
chins-and-exploring-these-interesting-ideas" kind of way. 
More importantly, the authors appear not to get, or at least to 
be talking past, the point of storytelling as a genre of legal scholar­
ship. That is, they wholly miss the radical argument that the choice 
of which stories are "accurate," "valid" or "good scholarship" is a 
political choice, which for its validity requires the suppression or 
marginalization of alternative "counterstories" or descriptions that 
are equally useful. 
Take for example the authors' challenge to three "merit" stories 
about discrimination in law faculty hiring. The authors take partic­
ular issue with a fictional story told by Derrick Bell in 1985 about 
hiring black recruits, a 1991 story by Patricia Williams about 
Harvard's failure to hire a woman of color, and conflicting accounts 
of an unsuccessful interview of a minority told by Richard Delgado 
in 1988 (pp. 75-77). According to the authors, those stories are not 
representative in light of the results of an American Association of 
Law Schools ("AALS") study, in which the AALS collected data 
on approximately half of law faculty hires.31 The authors choose to 
privilege the AALS study, despite its limited scope and the fact that 
it was conducted significantly later than the time period in which 
the authors told their merit stories. The authors' AALS story about 
"objective merit" becomes an ideological myth, which for its power 
requires the suppression or marginalization of alternative counter 
stories. And critical scholars are not the only ones telling those 
counter stories. They are also told by authors like Richard Chused 
30. Pp. 73, 84-86. In a rather bizarre moment, the authors tell two versions of a quite 
disturbing story about Suzanna Sherry's mother, ostensibly to make a point about truth-tell­
ing. Pp. ·112-16. I suspect, however, that Sherry's mother could not have been too happy 
about either version of the story making it into print. 
31. See pp. 77, 173 n.7 (citing Richard A. White, Statistical Report on the Gender and 
Minority Composition of New Law Teachers and AALS Faculty Appointments Register Can­
didates, 44 J. LEGAL Eouc. 424, 429-30 (1994)). 
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- who, like Delgado, found in 1988 that minorities were woefully 
underrepresented on law faculties, 3 2  and Deborah Merritt - who, 
like Williams, found in 1997 (six years after Williams's work) that 
women of color still suffered from a significant disadvantage in the 
hiring process relative to white men and women. 3 3  The authors also 
fail to point out that Harvard did not hire a tenure-track or tenured 
woman of color until this year, a full seven years after Williams's 
1991 story. 3 4  
Farber and Sherry's more general argument is that storytelling 
makes for bad scholarship because it deprives scholars of a common 
agreed-upon language, in which facts can be empirically verified as 
. "true or false, " stories have only one meaning, and the identity of 
the author or the viewpoint of the reader is irrelevant to that mean­
ing (p. 87). But in defining scholarly discourse in this way, Farber 
and Sherry imply that the only knowledge worth being produced by 
the legal academy is an argument that is authorless and 
readerless, 3 5  that admits only of one meaning (traceable to the 
"plain meaning " of the words that are used), and that is independ­
ent of time, place, or history. To achieve their so-called universal 
language for scholarship, the authors must exclude and marginalize 
stories that depend for their "knowledge value " on information 
about the writer, on the interpretive lens of the reader, or on analy­
sis of a particular time, place, or event that may not be representa­
tive for all people at all times. Farber and Sherry cannot really 
mean that nothing of knowledge value is contributed when Patricia 
Williams points out, in a voice that betrays her personal anger and 
frustration, that as of 1991 Harvard had yet to hire permanently a 
woman of color for a tenure-track position. 
One final and relatively minor note. Despite Farber and 
Sherry's implication to the contrary, radical scholars do not have a 
monopoly on what the authors characterize as ad hominem attacks. 
In fact, the authors engage in a bit of polemic themselves when they 
lead off with a quote from Salman Rushdie, who thinks it important 
to "name rubbish as rubbish, "(p. 1) and when they diagnose radical 
theorists with a mild-to-extreme case of paranoia (p. 135). 
32. See Richard H. Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women on Amer­
ican Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 537 (1988). 
33. See Deborah Jones Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, Race, and Credentials: The 
Truth About Affirmative Action in Law Faculty Hiring, 97 CowM. L. REv. 199 (1997). 
34. Harvard hired Lani Guinier in January 1998. See Harvard Hires Ex-Clinton Nominee, 
Aruz. REPUBLIC, Jan. 24, 1998, at A7. 
35. See Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEo. LJ. 453, 456 (1996) ("[N]either the 
identity of the speaker nor her institutional role should be relevant to the persuasiveness of 
an argument."). 
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Judge Richard Posner, a fellow critic of radicals, cranks up the 
level of polemic several steps on behalf of the authors in his review 
of their book: 
By exaggerating the plight of the groups for which they are the 
self-appointed spokesmen, the critical race theorists come across as 
whiners and wolf-criers. By forswearing analysis in favor of story­
telling, they come across as labile and intellectually limited. By em­
bracing the politics of identity, they come across as divisive . . . .  Their 
lodgment in law schools is a disgrace to legal education, which lacks 
the moral courage and the intellectual self-confidence to pronounce a 
minority movement's scholarship bunk.36 
Posner's florid but forcefully phrased "attack prose" demon­
strates that even a strictly empirical law and economics scholar can 
degrade scholarly discourse with the best of them (and can throw 
around fancy words like "lodgment," which like "hegemonic" 
evokes a notion of being particularly well-entrenched). Indeed, af­
ter reading Posner's expose on radical scholars' so-very-obvious 
lack of merit, one wonders why Ivy League schools do not toss con­
artists like Patricia Williams and Duncan Kennedy out into the 
street. More darkly, one wonders why it is that, for Posner, these 
scholars do not enjoy the presumption of merit that credentials like 
Columbia and Harvard typically confer. Ultimately, Posner's 
"scholarship" serves its purpose - it lays out very clearly his 
deeply political conclusions about critical race scholars and minor­
ity law professors. Neither he nor Farber and Sherry, however, 
have left themselves much room to protest when a forthcoming re­
sponse is equally politicized and forceful. 
IV. "THE LAST TIME I SAW RICHARD": RICHARD RORTY AND 
RADICAL PRAGMATISM 
In Chapter Five, which is in many ways the centerpiece of the 
book, Farber and Sherry contend that the radical critique of truth 
and merit ought to be rejected because it destroys the notion of 
democracy, and because it is nihilist and will lead to Holocaust de­
nial and totalitarianism. 
At the beginning of their penultimate chapter, the authors again 
claim that they do not take a position on the idea of Truth with a 
capital T, nor do they engage in the metaphysical inquiry into 
whether one could ever verify the existence of external reality (p. 
96). But the authors' failure to take a theoretical position on the 
existence of truth and objectivity is, perhaps somewhat mislead­
ingly, buried amidst foundationalist rhetoric. Because Farber and 
Sherry want to be thought of as at least quasi-strong objectivists by 
their mainstream public readership, lest they seem as crazy as the 
36. Posner, supra note 4, at 43. 
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authors they attack, they take some pains in the book to adopt what 
appears to be the conventional line on rationalism. "What should 
we seek and what should we speak if not the truth?" ask Farber and 
Sherry. "The unhappy answers are politics, and political power" (p. 
102). 
In earlier articles, however, Farber and Sherry have been a bit 
more open about the fact that theirs is only a pragmatist defense of 
truth - they do not defend the existence of objective truth, but 
rather argue that it is pragmatically useful to assume that objective 
truth exists, or that we create truth as ways of organizing what 
otherwise would be chaotic experience.37 As Sherry puts it, even if 
there really is no such thing as objective reason, "unconnected to 
power relationships, we tend to - and perhaps we must - behave 
as if there were. "38 
Downplaying that quite radical-sounding argument, in Beyond 
All Reason Farber and Sherry make two broad pragmatic claims in 
defense of objective truth and merit. First, they argue that without 
the idea of objective truth and the scientific method, democratic 
constitutionalism would not be possible (pp. 107-08). Second, they 
claim that rationalism is essential because it gives us our best de­
fense to atrocities like the denial of the Holocaust, totalitarianism, 
and moral relativism.39 
Setting forth the first claim, Farber and Sherry contend that by 
questioning the existence of truth, radical theory risks the end of 
democracy and the collapse of rational civilization. Radical cri­
tique, according to the authors, "has affinities with totalitarianism. 
As part of the attack on the Enlightenment, the critique of truth 
suffers from a tendency to reinforce pre-Enlightenment despotism" 
(p. 106). In this quite formally rationalist vein, the authors argue 
that democracy relies on objective truth and the scientific method 
for its very existence: 
[T]he aspiration toward truth and objective methods of seeking it are 
integral to democratic constitutionalism. The two progeny of the En­
lightenment, democracy and the scientific method so disparaged by 
the radical multiculturalists, are indeed siblings. Both democracy and 
the scientific method - empirical experimentation designed to ap-
37. See Sherry, supra note 35, at 472-73 (arguing that it would be pragmatically better to 
pretend as though such things as objective truth and reason really did correspond to the 
world around us). See also Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 
MINN. L. REv. 1331, 1338-39 (1988) (rejecting as overly foundationalist the idea that a deter­
minate legal meaning can be deduced from original intent or shared community norms). 
38. Sherry, supra note 35, at 473. 
39. P. 108 ("(S]ocial constructionism creates a dilemma for those who believe that with 
regard to the Holocaust, some claim to 'truth' appears particularly imperative: postmodern 
thought's rejection of the possibility of identifying some stable reality or truth beyond the 
constant . . .  self-referentiality of linguistic constructs challenges the need to establish the 
realities and the truths of the Holocaust") (internal quotes and citation omitted). 
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proach objective truth - are closely related in their preference for 
intellectual authority over institutional authority, their insistence on 
universalism and objectivity, and their intellectual skepticism. In sci­
ence as in democracy, what matters is not who says it but whether it is 
right. [pp. 106-07] 
In a quite scholarly way, Farber and Sherry preface this argu­
ment with a quote from Richard Rorty, who at first glance appears 
to support them in their anti-democracy, Holocaust-denial argu­
ment: "Richard Rorty observes that although this insight is 'hard to 
live with[,]' social constructionism means 'that when the secret po­
lice come, when the torturers violate the innocent, there is nothing 
to be said to them of the form 'There is something within you which 
you are betraying' " (pp. 105-06). 
In linking up radical theory with nihilism and Holocaust denial� 
the authors do not argue that radical theorists are engaging in Hol­
ocaust denial or advocating totalitarianism, though they come close 
to accusing at least one Continental scholar of sympathizing with 
Nazis.40 Rather, the authors claim that the radicals' denial of objec­
tive truth can be misused in nihilistic fashion, to deny the existence 
of the Holocaust, among other atrocities (p. 109). It is pragmati­
cally useful to assume the existence of objective truth, the authors 
conclude, because to do otherwise risks nihilism and anti-Semitism. 
Skimming through the argument, the citation to Richard Rorty 
catches our eye. Wait a second, back up just a bit. Isn't Richard 
Rorty the pragmatist who promoted the idea that truth is socially 
constructed, and who argued that democracy does not depend on or 
require a theory of objective truth? Isn't he the same scholar who 
argued that there is no such thing as nihilism if one no longer ac­
cepts the idea of truth and objectivity? Why is it that the authors' 
citation to Rorty makes no mention of the above? And why is 
Rorty absent from the authors' lineup of radical scholars? 
Rorty's antifoundationalist critique of objectivity and truth 
surely is well-known to Farber and Sherry.41 Like the other radicals 
whom the authors target - and perhaps the authors themselves in 
their secret heart of hearts - Rorty argues that there is no Archi­
medean point outside of language and social convention from 
which to evaluate whether our ideas correspond to objective reality 
or to some objective "out in the world" truth about the human per­
sonality. Rorty argues that truth is the property of sentences in lan­
guage that describe the world, and not a property of the world 
itself: "The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are 
40. P. 64 (repeating the off-levied charge that Paul De Man, a noted deconstructionist, 
demonstrated Nazi sympathies when he wrote essays in a Belgian newspaper repudiating 
Jewish influence in literature). 
41. Farber cites to Rorty in several of his earlier articles. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 37, 
at 1337 & n.29 (citing Rorty for a good introduction to the tenets of pragmatism). 
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not. Only descriptions of the world can be true or false. The world 
on its own - unaided by the describing activities of human beings 
- cannot."42 For the pragmatist, "there is no pragmatic difference, 
no difference that makes a difference, between 'it works because 
it's true' and 'it's true because it works. "'43 Rorty carefully points 
out, however, that he is not arguing that there is no such thing as 
"the world out there," but only that we cannot ever know whether 
our perceptions of the world correspond with what is out there.44 
To the extent that we can never know whether our ideas about 
merit or math or mountains match up to some objective "out there 
in the world" or "human condition" reality, Rorty recommends that 
we give up trying to find out, because the inquiry does not appear 
to be particularly important, interesting, or useful. Rather than try­
ing to make our social conventions and ideas correspond with ob­
jective truth, argues Rorty, we should concentrate on what we do 
know - whether engaging in certain practices and describing 
things in a particular way is useful or productive for a particular 
community, that is, whether it helps us to control or predict our 
environments and lead happy lives.45 
Like Rorty, the authors appear to favor (at least when they are 
being "truthful") an approach to legal analysis that can be called 
pragmatism. But the authors' version of pragmatism differs signifi­
cantly from Rorty's. Farber and Sherry believe that our current 
conceptions of truth, objectivity, and merit - as they correspond to 
the real world out there - are essential and should be preserved 
even if we don't "really" believe in them. In that sense, Farber's 
and Sherry's pragmatism is a very narrow, conservative kind of 
pragmatism that preserves much if not all of the conventional 
worldview, and advocates little change, if any.46 
In contrast, Rorty believes that truth and objectivity are not at 
all useful for evaluating alternative frameworks of thinking, and in 
fact he finds them quite counterproductive.47 Rorty's pragmatism 
finds it much less important, at least at the level of the individual 
person, to preserve conventional frameworks of thinking, and thus 
allows for more far-reaching, thinking-outside-the-box progressive 
change. 
In addition, in terms of method, conservative pragmatists like 
Farber and Sherry prefer to assimilate new and potentially contra­
dictory information into old frameworks in order to disrupt them as 
42. RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY S (1989). 
43. Id. at 8. 
44. See id. at S, 13. 
4S. See id. at 6, 14-lS, and SS. 
46. See William N. Eskridge, Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REv. 607, 612-13 (1994). 
47. See RoRTY, supra note 42, at S. 
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little as possible.48 In contrast, progressive pragmatists like Rorty 
find it desirable, at least at the level of the private individual, to 
break free from or to transcend those pre-existing frameworks or 
worldviews. From a Rortian perspective, 
[e]ach individual is a dynamic player in this game and makes her own 
choices about which script to follow and what metaphors to employ. 
While most individuals make conventional choices and accept the de­
scriptions handed down to them, the triumphant player seeks escape 
from inherited descriptions and formulates a cognitive framework of 
her own. This redescription is valuable insofar as it is productive for 
her life . . . . 49 
How does Rorty help us to respond to Farber's and Sherry's 
pragmatic arguments in favor of rationalism? First, Rorty directly 
contradicts the authors' initial argument that rationalism is required 
to lay the foundation for democracy. In particular, Rorty argues 
that "the vocabulary of Enlightenment rationalism, although it was 
essential to the beginnings of liberal democracy, has become an im­
pediment to the preservation and progress of democratic socie­
ties. "50 According to Rorty, the argument that democracy requires­
rationalism might have been useful when rationalism and the scien­
tific method were in their heyday, but it is less useful post Kuhn and 
Feyerabend, when the value of the scientific method is neither well­
defined nor a particularly interesting source of description.51 For 
Rorty, it is more useful to describe democracy as a collection of 
shared beliefs about human solidarity and the need to reduce cru­
elty than as an institutionalized expression of rational thought.52 
Second, Rorty helps us to deal with the authors' claim that radi­
cal theory inevitably results in nihilism. The authors argue that 
without objective reason, there is no way to choose between com­
peting claims or descriptions of the world, no way to refute Holo­
caust denial or to denounce anti-Semitism. According to Rorty, 
that argument begs the initial question: the nihilism argument per­
suades the reader only if she has already decided that rationalism is 
useful in adjudicating between competing language games. Only 
those who already accept an Archimedean point from which to 
choose the more "real" or "true" claim will find the idea of choos­
ing a metaphysically grounded option to be a productive exercise.53 
48. See Eskridge, supra note 46, at 613. 
49. Id. at 623. 
50. RoRTY, supra note 42, at 44. 
51. See RoRTY, supra note 42, at 51-52. Farber himself appears to agree with tbis propo­
sition, at least partially. See Farber, supra note 37, at 1335-36 (citing with approval tbe intel­
lectual move from unitary scientific method to a nonfoundationalist view of the scientific 
enterprise). 
52. See RoRTY, supra note 42, at 141-98. 
53. See id. at 44-45, 48-49. 
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Of course, progressive is one step down from radical. Rorty 
himself is open to the criticism that he is too conservative, because 
he claims that one should experiment with alternative vocabularies 
only at the level of the private individual, but not at the collective 
level.54 In the next section, I try to sketch the outlines of a radical 
pragmatism - not the conservative pragmatism of Farber and 
Sherry, nor the progressive but ultimately limited pragmatism of 
Rorty, but something that extends Rorty's progressive vision be­
yond the private endeavor to social institutions. 
A. Radical Rorty: Progressive Pragmatism Modified 
Pragmatism need not suffer from conservatism, banality, and 
lack of ambition, nor from the limitations of a private individualist 
pragmatism. In this section, I want to propose that, by highlighting 
the way in which institutions gloss over difference and diversity in 
the name of commonality and universality, radical theory can rein­
vigorate pragmatism and rescue it from Farber and Sherry's ten­
dency toward complacency and from the limits of Rorty's one­
person revolution. 
My version of radical pragmatism can be characterized by two 
central propositions. First, in determining whether some particular 
social practice is useful to an interpretive community, outsider 
scholars should expose and highlight group differences within social 
institutions. Radical pragmatists should seek to identify within an 
interpretive community conflicts about what it means to be "use­
ful," for whom something ought be useful, and what purposes social 
institutions ought to serve. 
Second, in generating scholarship that advocates for social 
change, radical scholars should explicitly engage in a very local and 
instrumentalist political argument. Radical pragmatists should gen­
erate politically effective claims from the perspective of the out­
sider, in order to advance those political commitments toward 
including outsiders in the community, including alternative pur­
poses in social institutions, and including revolutionary visions of 
what it means to be "useful" in mainstream discourse. 
1. Problematizing Pragmatism: Identifying Difference 
Pragmatism's central project - for both Rorty and the authors 
- lies in describing practices or vocabularies in terms of whether 
they are useful for a particular interpretive community in helping to 
predict and control the community's environment. Radical prag­
matism problematizes that inquiry, to highlight not commonality 
54. See e.g., Joan C. Williams Rorty, Radicalism, Romanticism: The Politics of the Gaze, 
1992 Wis. L. RE.v. 131; Joseph William Singer, Should Lawyers Care About Philosophy?, 
1989 DuKE L.J. 1752, 1757-59 (book review). 
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and universality but difference and conflict within social institu­
tions. Beyond seeking to find what is useful for a community, radi­
cal pragmatism asks three additional questions that are designed to 
take into account the exercise of social and institutional power. 
Initially, radical pragmatism adds the question "useful for what 
purpose or political commitment?" Posing that question should 
help to expose the internal power conflicts that might beset an in­
terpretive community in coming to consensus on the purpose of a 
particular social institution. For example, Farber and Sherry might 
argue that the purpose of selection processes like law school admis­
sions standards should be to maximize human productivity in a fair 
way. Rorty and his cohorts might argue that the purpose of selec­
tion processes should be to minimize cruelty and suffering for those 
who are traditionally disenfranchised. Radicals might argue that, in 
light of historical patterns of exclusion, selection processes should 
be designed to enhance the participation of all groups in human 
institutions. 
All three visions might co-exist in the same community. Hence, 
in working through pragmatic inquiries, it is important to expose 
the conflicting political commitments about the appropriate pur­
pose of a social institution. Asking the "useful for what purpose" 
question helps to identify and then contest the suppressed conflicts 
behind a purportedly common purpose. 
To be sure, purposes are often not fully articulable until after 
the social institution has been around for awhile. Asking the "for 
what purpose" question will reveal that purpose is often still in 
evolution. As Rorty points out, often we cannot articulate the pur­
pose of a vocabulary or language game until after the vocabulary 
has fully developed.ss 
Second, radical pragmatism asks "useful for whom? Who is in­
cluded in the relevant community and who is excluded?"S6 By ask­
ing that question, radical pragmatism exposes the exclusion that 
necessarily must take place when defining a purportedly universal 
community (for example, "the global economy," "Americans"). 
The notion of community has meaning only if it includes a defined 
set of people, which necessarily requires excluding a defined set of 
other people. Our American political community, for example, ex­
cludes for certain political purposes foreign nationals, immigrants 
who have not been authorized to immigrate, children, people with 
mental disabilities, and criminals. Likewise, the American commu­
nity may have defined its American-ness by excluding communities 
of color from the political community. 
55. See RoRTY, supra note 42, at 12-13, 55. 
56. See Margaret Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699, 1710 
(1996) (asking the question "who is we?"). 
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In defending conventional meritocracy, Farber and Sherry ap­
pear to define meritocracy in a way that includes Jews - and to a 
lesser extent Asian Americans - who have achieved under tradi­
tional merit standards. Indeed, the authors acknowledge that it is 
legitimate to evaluate an institution on the basis of its usefulness for 
- or impact on - certain social groups like Jews or Asians. To be 
sure, preserving conventional meritocracy might be useful for those 
groups, and for the dominant majority in the privileged position at 
the top. But it appears far less useful for Latina/os and blacks, who 
are disproportionately excluded by conventional merit standards. 
Finally, radical pragmatism asks "what does it mean to be use­
ful?" During a recent debate at the University of Illinois College of 
Law between Professor Farber and myself, we agreed that it was 
important to ask whether conventional meritocratic law school ad­
missions standards were useful to blacks and Latina/os, as well as to 
Jews and Asians, but we disagreed on what we meant by useful.57 I 
argued that usefulness should be measured by whether selection 
criteria put people of color immediately into positions of power and 
responsibility, so that they could decide what counts as merit and 
what the legal profession should look like. Farber thought that such 
a measure was short-sighted and argued that it would be more use­
ful to measure success by conventional merit standards, and to pro­
mote long-term success via education.58 
Certainly, we could not resolve our disagreement purely by ref­
erence to empirical or rationalist analysis. Ours is a disagreement 
that springs from our differing political commitments. But by ask:. 
ing the question of what it means to call a practice "useful," we 
were able to expose that important political difference and debate 
it. 
The answers to these questions - what does it mean to be use­
ful, useful for whom, and for what purpose - invariably will be a 
function of differing political commitments, group affiliations and 
worldviews. The differences that these questions expose are thus 
"rationally undecidable," because choices between them cannot be 
grounded in anything outside of contingent political commitments, 
affiliations or worldviews. 
Once uncovered, those differences can become the locus of 
struggle at the collective level. Unlike conservative pragmatism, 
which seeks to preserve conventional frameworks of thinking, and 
progressive pragmatism, which seeks to transcend convention at the 
private level, radical pragmatism seeks to transcend convention at 
the level of the social institution, so that difference can become the 
57. See Debate Between Daniel Farber and Daria Roithmayr, University of Illinois Col· 
lege of Law (Oct. 10, 1997). 
58. See id. 
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subject of political struggle. By highlighting difference, radical 
pI!agmatism attempts to avoid the relative complacency that charac­
terizes conservatives like Farber and Sherry, who are more inter­
ested in refurbishing existing institutions with new pragmatic. 
justifications. By extending the pragmatic inquiry to the level of the 
social institution, radical pragmatism seeks to transcend the limits 
of Rortian pragmatism, which promotes the private pursuit of prag­
matism while preserving social life in the conventional liberal mold. 
2. Deciding the Undecidable: Political Persuasion 
The essence of political struggle is trying to come to terms with 
those rationally undecidable differences amidst the exercise of so­
cial power. Stanley Fish writes that radical theory has had little if 
anything to say about the all-important political argument, which 
takes place after radical theory has cleared from the table claims to 
�'truth" and "objectivity."59 How then ought radical pragmatists to 
engage in political struggle? 
· 
Of course, the most difficult political struggle involves compet­
ing political commitments and mutually exclusive positions, particu­
larly where one commitment enjoys a privileged position over an 
"outsider commitment." To resolve that difficulty, Farber and 
Sherry claim that reason constitutes the universal language that cuts 
across, and can resolve all differences between, conflicting perspec­
tives. "[B]ecause we are all engaged in a common search for truth, 
'political decisions [must] be made through persuasion by a shared 
language . . .  " (p. 107). 
From the progressive pragmatist perspective, Rorty argues that 
consensus about conflicting vocabularies or approaches is gener­
ated through a conversation undistorted by power in which each 
participant appeals to the commitments of the other, a sort of dia­
lectical give and take in a "free and open encounter."6° To give the 
open and free encounter some hope of usefulness, Rorty relies on 
what he sees as a human ability to empathize or identify with the 
outsider who does not share conventionally privileged political 
commitments, group affiliations, or world views. 61 
In contrast, radical theorists like Ernesto Laclau point out that 
consensus will only form when one group is able to exercise power 
over other groups, by suppressing other alternative descriptions of 
59. STANLEY F1sH, THERE'S No SucH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND !T's A Gooo TmNG 
Too 178-79 (1994). 
60. RoRTY, supra note 42, at 60. 
61. See id. 
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the world and painting their approach or vocabulary as natural or 
inevitable. 62 
My version of radical pragmatism does not depend either on 
. Farber and Sherry's universal reason or Rorty's undistorted, em­
pathetic conversation to promote the interests of the disen­
franchised. Radical pragmatist method takes its direction more 
from Laclau's vision of the exercise of political power. However, 
radical pragmatism does not prescribe only one way of struggling 
against that power. 
Rather, radical pragmatism - from the perspective of the out­
sider - is explicitly, perhaps crassly, instrumentalist. It exhorts 
people of color and other outsiders to focus on the objective of ad­
vancing radical political commitments to empowerment and eman­
cipation. Depending on the particular and local context, we radical 
scholars ought to use conservative, progressive or radical pragma­
tist methods, or some combination thereof, when it would be useful 
in advancing radical political commitments to do so. 
For some issues and in certain historical, social, and economic 
and political circumstances, radical scholars may want to (and do) 
engage in political argument in a relatively conservative way, by 
pointing out where certain radical political commitments already 
exist in mainstream thought. For example, in a forthcoming article 
I want to defend affirmative action programs as a species of anti­
trust intervention, designed to break up the monopoly that whites 
have in the competition for resources and opportunities. Such an 
argument makes use of existing categories of legal thought to ad­
vance a radical political commitment to affirmative action. 
In other circumstances, given other histories and social forces 
and economic pressures, radical scholars should (and do) spend 
time in coming up with progressive or even revolutionary social 
metaphors, in the hopes that some of these redescriptions will 
prove useful to particular people. For example, radical scholars 
have generated a multitude of innovative ways to think about race 
relations. Critical race scholars recently have redescribed the state 
of contemporary race relations by hybridizing the concept of race 
with geography or post-colonialism.63 Using theories of cultural 
pluralism, Professor Duncan Kennedy has argued that affirmative 
action programs are necessary to put into positions of power and 
responsibility people of color, who have been excluded from all 
62. Ernesto Laclau, Deconstruction, Pragmatism, Hegemony, in DECONSTRUCTION AND 
PRAGMATISM 60-61 (Chantal Mouffe ed., 1996). 
63. See JosE D. SALDIVAR, THE DIALECTICS OF OuR AMEruCA: GENEALOGY, CUL­
TURAL CRITIQUE, AND LITERARY HISTORY (1991) (discussing race and postcolonialism); 
Richard T. Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Jurisdictional Formation and Racial Segrega­
tion, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1365 (1997); Eric Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances: Agency, Responsi­
bility and Interracial Justice, 33 AsIAN PAc. AM. L.J. 33 (1995) (discussing post-colonialism). 
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previous decisionmaking about what counts as merit.64 Radical the­
ory - which demonstrates the contingency of descriptions, their 
historical role in perpetuating the exercise of social power, and 
their revisability - opens the possibility of completely revolution­
ary vocabularies to capture the social imagination and incite social 
transformation. 
But pragmatic inquiry should guide the postmodernist approach 
to social change. Radical scholars should decide whether, in a par­
ticular local context, political commitments towards including out­
siders might be better advanced through revolutionary social 
rupture - when it might be useful to dispense wholesale with con­
ventional ways of thinking - or whether a more progressive or 
conservative approach might better serve radical aims. Revolution­
ary redescription may be the most advisable option in some cases 
but also may be the least advisable in others. 
Toward that end, radical scholars should generate in neo-Dar­
winist fashion as many new metaphors about outsider/insider rela­
tions as possible - some deconstructive, some progressive, some 
conservative - to increase the likelihood that one of these meta­
phors will "take," that is, will advance radical political commit­
ments and move us in new, more useful directions. Radical scholars 
should also work to change the social, political and economic envi­
ronments in which those metaphors will be received. But the lode­
star that ought guide radical scholars in our choice of how to engage 
in political struggle is "what works to advance radical political com­
mitments to outsiders' emancipation?" 
CoNCLUSION: "IT's You AND ME AGAINST THE WoRLD" 
As the previous section indicates, I found Farber and Sherry's 
book a quite provocative point for starting important and serious 
conversation about how we ought to think about our social 
institutions. 
I should also point out that there are several areas on which I 
agree with the authors. For example, as the foregoing section indi­
cates, I think that they are right in focusing political disagreements 
on pragmatic questions of usefulness, though they do so in a disin­
genuous fashion and with a brand of pragmatism that is too conven­
tionally rationalist. I also agree, although they do not make this 
point explicitly, that radical scholars ought to devote far more at­
tention to engaging in political struggle with the mainstream, r�ther 
than talking - as law professors are wont to do - only to each 
other. 
64. See Kennedy, supra note 15, at 712-14. 
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I do not know whether I would put Farber and Sherry on the 
other side of the front line of the battle between radicals and ratio­
nalists. It certainly seems as though the authors themselves, and 
their comrades, would position them there. In his review of Beyond 
All Reason for The New York Times, Judge Alex Kozinski paints a 
picture of impending radical takeover very similar to that portrayed 
by Farber and Sherry in their book. He lauds the authors as brave 
pioneers, willing to risk their own professional hides and speak out 
despite the potential personal cost: 
' 
While traditional liberals still dominate the law schools in terms of 
numbers, they are mostly a cowardly lot, unwilling to risk their peace­
ful careers to tell the alarming truth to the world outside. In writing 
this book, Farber and Sherry have taken a personal risk. If those of us 
outside the academy fail to take heed, we will not be able to say we 
were not warned. 65 -
In the law school war between radical and rationalist academics, 
has the radicals' position on radicalism really begun to sweep the 
legal academy? If not, then the authors themselves must suffer 
from a bit of paranoia. If so, isn't it Farber and Sherry who now 
have become the radicals, at least in the academic world? If (as 
Judge Kozinski argues) academics all agree that there is no such 
thing as objective truth and the concepts of equality and merit are 
"a bit quaint and dated - like stale granola,"66 Farber and Sherry 
would appear to be just two radical dissenters seeking to overthrow 
the postmodern views of the academic world. Perhaps we ought to 
buy them each a beret. 
65. Kozinski, supra note 8, at 46. Similarly, as discussed supra note 8, Farber and Sherry 
note that, prior to taking on the book, they had been warned against making their argument 
(obviously, to no avail). P. 14. 
66. Kozinski, supra note 8, at 46. 
